A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by bounded rationality.
INTRODUCTION
In standard games the choice set for player i is assumed to be a collection of "strategies," i.e., functions which assign to each of player i's information sets S~ one of the arcs which follows a repre- 1 sentative vertex of S~ (see Owen [7] ). Strategies are thus complete 1 contingency plans for playing the game at hand. Once a strategy has been chosen by every player (possibly including a strategy "chosen by chance"), a unique outcome for the game is determined.
The usefulness of the standard game theory framework for realworld problems is somewhat limited. In actual problem contexts the specification of available actions in the form of complete contingency plans is often not feasible. Information may necessarily be incomplete; alternatively, the required calculations may be too costly. Players in real-world games generally plan in advance for only a limited number of moves. Secondly, the implicit requirement that the chance strategies be defined independently of the other players' strategy choices often imposes an awkward formulation on real-world problems.
In this paper a "policy game" (p-game) is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for group decision problems constrained by bounded rationality. The players are allowed to specify their available actions in the form of partial contingency plans ("controls"). Their choice sets are assumed to be collections of endmean, candidate goal-control pairs ("policies"). The candidate goals *Research underlying this paper was supported by National Science Foundation Grant GS-3l276X.
are operationally interpreted as potential objectives (e.g., market share aspiration levels) whose realization the players can attempt to achieve by appropriate choice of control. Chance strategies and consequences (e.g., monetary payoffs) are subsumed into "state flows" over which the players' policy-conditioned preference and probability orders are both defined. Thus, in a manner to be made precise below, chance strategies need not be defined independently of the players' .policy choices. The existence of objective (expected utility) functions representing the players' preferences among joint policies is axiomatized.
For games with only one player, the p-game reduces to the policy model (goal-control model) formulated in Tesfatsion [9] . As shown 2 there, the Savage expected utility model, the Marschak-Radner team model, the Bayesian statistical decision model, and the standard optimal control model can be viewed as special cases of the policy model. Similarly, it is shown in this paper that the standard n-person game in normal form can be viewed as a special type of p-game.
The importance of explicit, nontautological 1 goal specification in problems of individual choice is discussed and illustrated in Tesfatsion [9] . Briefly, specified goals and controls play distinct strategic roles in many decision problems. Moreover, goals can be important for the feedback evaluation of chosen policies; i.e., the utility or cost of a chosen policy may be a function of the "distance" between the realized outcome and the target 2 outcome (goal) specified in the chosen policy.
In game theory the importance of explicit, nontautologica1 goal specification is potentially even greater. As Aumann [1] notes, for a standard n-person game the implications of a particular coalition structure (partition of the player set) are often quite clear; but what is ,'. ) often not clear is why a particular coalition structure should initially form. For p-games, with nontautological goals explicitly introduced, it seems reasonable to predict that players with complementary candidate goals will form coalitions. Thus certain initial restrictions on the players' candidate goal sets might in some cases be used to restrict the number of coalition structures that can "rationally" form, prior to any consideration of imputed coalition values. Indeed, real-world players free to cooperate but constrained by bounded rationality would probably not bother to impute values for coalitions containing players with highly conflicting candidate goals.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2 the p-game is presented and discussed in normal form; i.e., with individual objective (expected utility) functions for the players simply assumed given. In section 3, drawing on results from Tesfatsion [10] , it is shown that necessary and sufficient conditions exist for "primitive" p-games with finite state flow sets to have this normal form. It is also shown that a standard n-person game in normal form can be viewed as a special type of ax iomati zed primitive p-game in normal form.
In section 4, drawing on results from Tesfatsion [11] , conditions are given for an n-person p-game to have at least one pure policy Nash equilibrium point. Also, drawing on results from Tesfatsion [12] , a broad class of 2-person threat p-games for which a unique pure policy Nash bargaining solution exists is characterized in terms of three, simple, empirically meaningful properties of the joint objective function: compact domain, continuity, and "corner concavity." Conditions are also given for the existence of at least one pure policy Nash equilibrium threat solution. As will be discussed further below, pure policy sets corresponding to p-games must realistically be allowed to be disconnected if the candidate goal sets are nontrivial. The existence results in section 4 are nontrivial extensions of standard game theory in that connectedness of the policy and payoff sets is not required.
In section 5 an example is given of a primitive 2-person p-game with expected utility representation as in section 2.
2.
THE POLICY GAME Let G = {g, ... } be a set of (joint) candidate goals~ and for each g c G let I\(g) = {A(g), ... } be a set of (joint) C"ontrols. be the selection by the n players of a joint policy (candidate goalcontrol pair) in the policy choice set @ which is "optimal" in some sense with respect to this joint objective function.
The game is fully specified only when "optimal" is defined and rules are given concerning allowable cooperation. These rules must in turn be combined with specific assumptions concerning the structure of for their organization; at the same time they may heartily disagree (act noncooperatively) in voting for a particular presidential-vice presidential ticket as an instrument for achieving this platform.
AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO THE POLICY GAME
The normal form for standard games is generally interpreted as a 6 reduced form representation for an "extensive" game described in more detailed terms. Similarly, as will be shown below, a p-game in normal form can be interpreted as a representation for a more primitive p-game.
However, unlike extensive games in which functional representations for probability and preference are already assumed to exist, this "primitive p-game" is defined entirely in terms of sets and relations (3.1).
Thus the normal form representation for the primitive p-game must be axiomatized; it is not a reduced form. As will be seen below (3.2), necessary and sufficient conditions exist for primitive p-games with finite state flow sets to have a normal form representation. In 3.3
it will be shown that the standard n-person game in normal form can be interpreted as an axiomatized primitive p-game in normal form.
3.1 THE PRIMITIVE P-GAME: Let G be a set of (joint) candidate goals~ and for each g € G let A(g) = {A(g), .
•. } be a set of (joint) The candidate goals and controls can be interpreted as in section i The weak orders ~ , i E n*, can be interpreted as preference orders as follows. For all joint policies e', e" E (9:
7 i e' ~ e" <=> the joint selection of e' is at least as desirable to player i as the joint selection of e".
For each e E (9 and i E n*, the set ~i(e) of state flows wi(e) can be interpreted as player i's answer to the following question: "If joint policy e were to be chosen by the n players, what distinct situations (Le., state flows wi (e)) might obtain?" The state flows may include references to past, present, and future happenings. In order for subsequent probability assessments to be realistically feasible, each state flow should include player i's background information concerning the decision problem at hand.
i The e-conditioned preference order ~ can be interpreted as fole lows. For all w',w" E ~i(e), i w' ~e w" <=> the realization of w' is at least as desirable to player i as the realization of w'~ given the event "the n players choose e."
i Similarly, the e-conditioned probability order ~e can be interpreted as follows. For all event flows E', E" e: 2\ti(e), i E' ~8 E" <=> in the judgment of player i, the realization of E' is at least as likely as the realization of E", given the e"en::: "the n player[: cheose e."
A state flow may be relevant for player i's decision problem under distinct potential policy choices; i.e., \ti(8) n ~i(e') i ~ for some e, a' e: 8. Similarly for event flows. Given state flows w, w' e: ~i(e ) n~i(e'), it may hold that w i i satisfying for all w, w' € n 1 (e), su~h that (4) J u 1 (wle)ol( dw le) > f u1(wle')'1.( dw le') <=> e n 1 (8) °l(e') for all 8, 8 
The conditions A* are restrictions on player l's preference and probability orders
For primitive n-person p-games with finite state flow sets, necessary and sufficient conditions for th~ existence of an individual ~bjective (expected utility) representation as in (2) , (3), (4) for ea2h player's policy preference order can be obtained by requiring conditions A* to hold for each player's preference and probability orders
The expected utility representation (2) , (3) and (4) (n*; e; IT. * U.: e ~Rn) ,
1.E:n 1.
as in section 2.
STANDARD GAMES AS P-GAMES: For standard n-person games
r in normal form (see Owen [7] ), the choice of strategies 0 n* i' n* i · n* i ' where, for each i E n*, the objective function U ,. II @~ ~ R for i ' n* 1. player i is given by e.' . and mixed or correlated strategy solutions (see Owen [7] ).
On the other hand, in real-world group decision contexts such as boardroom meetings, union versus management, and presidential elections, the flipping of coins is seldom observed. Conditions ensuring the existence of pure solutions are thus of particular interest. As is well known, all fjnite standard n-person g.:lmes in extensive form with "complete information" have pure strategy Nash equilibrium points (Owen, Horeover, the existence theorems established fer N2.sh equilibrium points in mixed strategy games in normal form can be extended to pure strategy games in normal form having convex strategy sets. In addition, Debreu [2] has established the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium points for games in normal form whose individual strategy sets are contractible (hence connected) polyhedra. On the other hand, no Nash equilibrium existence results appear to have been established for games in normal form having disconnected strategy sets. Similarly, Nash's bargaining solution has been investigated only for games with convex (hence connected) payoff regions.
The joint policy choice set 8 for p-games is a disjoint union U G ({g} x A(g» of policy subsets {g} x A(g) corresponding to the gE:
distinct candidate goals g E: G. Unless G is a trivial one-element set,
it cannot be assumed that 8 is connected; similarly for the payoff region IT *U. (8) . In theorems 4.2 and 4.5 below, conditions are given 
DEFINITION: Let a free n-person p-game (n*' IT 8.'
, n* l ' IT * 8. will be called a pure policy Nash equilibrium point 
4) The Lefschetz number of T (with respect to Cech homology over F) 1:S not zer'o.
Then r has at least one pure policy Nash equilibp1:wn point. Assume C views his problem as the following free noncooperative p-game between himself and a typical student S, in which he has the first move (i.e., C will implement his chosen policy before S). Let WO denote C's background information concerning the parking problem. In particular, assume WO contains the information that the current daily diligence index for detecting illegally parked bikes is \; i.e., C believes that at present, on any given day, the probability is ~ that his officers making the rounds will detect a bike parked illegally next to the library. It seems reasonable to assume that C is worried about the possible effects that the various joint policy choices by C and S might have on this diligence index. For example, C might be quite sure that the index would rise if he were to announce to his officerts the goal gl: (maximize collected fines, to be used for merit awards), whereas at best the index would stay the same if he were to exhort them with g2:(minimize illegal parking).
C's Candidate Goal Set
To examine the various possibilities, C asks himself the following The set of pareto optimal joint policies is {(e' e') (e" e") (e" e')} c' s ' C' s' C' s whereas the set of Nash equilibrium joint policies is { (e " , e ") , ( e III, 8 '" ) } • C S C S
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The highest utility level C can guarantee for himself is 6, through choice of e~, assuming that S is "rational" and consequently chooses e~. The resulting joint policy (e~,e~) is a unique pareto optimal -Nash equilibrium solution, yielding a joint payoff of (6, 6) . 4A collection F of subsets of a nonempty set X is said to be an algebra in X if F has the following three properties: 
